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INTRODUCTION

The decision to end a teacher's employment with a public school
system in Texas requires the school district to face a myriad of issues.
There are the obvious questions concerning the factual basis, as well
as the personnel or educational justifications for the decision. These
business and educational considerations are entangled with statutory
and constitutional requirements and prohibitions. These requirements and prohibitions, while affording the teacher a certain amount
of job security, have been viewed by many school district officials and
administrators as unnecessary obstacles to the maintenance of an efficient and competent school staff. The purpose of this article is to
discuss both the substantive and procedural requirements of teacher
termination and nonrenewal in the Texas public schools, outlining the
problems associated with those requirements, and proposing certain
changes to simplify the process.
Analysis of a school district's decision with respect to a teacher's
employment, and the procedures necessitated thereby, is best accomplished through division of the relevant facts into three categories.
Different grounds or different procedures may be required depending
upon: (1) the timing of the decision (nonrenewal versus termination);
(2) the type of employment system utilized by the district (continuing
versus term); and (3) the status of the teacher (probationary versus
tenured). Once the correct categorizations are made, the required
reasons and applicable procedures can be found in the appropriate
statutes.
A.

Nonrenewal versus Termination

The first categorization to be made is based on whether a termination or a nonrenewal is involved. For the purposes of this article,
"termination" is used to describe a situation in which a teacher is
either being discharged during the school year, or, in the case of a
teacher with a multi-year contract, the teacher is being discharged at
a time prior to the date his contract expires.' The term "nonrenewal"
refers to a decision to either not continue employment for an upcom1. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 13.109 (Vernon 1972) (teacher discharge under continuing or probationary contract); id. § 21.210 (Vernon Supp. 1985) (term contract termination).
In Chapter 13, "discharge," as opposed to "termination," is used to describe the mid-year
severance of a teacher's employment in continuing contract districts. See id. § 13.109 (Vernon
1972).
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ing school year, or, if a multi-year contract is involved, not extend the
employment beyond the end of the contract's term.' There are important substantive and procedural differences between "termination"
and "nonrenewal." Attorneys and courts should avoid the tendency
to use the two words interchangeably.
B.

Continuing versus Term Contracts

A second factor to be considered in analyzing a teacher's rights in
employment decisions is the type of employment system utilized by
the employing school district. In Texas, school districts have one of
two types of contractual relationships with full-time teachers: "term
contracts"3 or "continuing contracts." 4 In term contract school districts, a teacher is employed for a term of one or more years.' These
districts cannot enter into employment contracts for terms exceeding
either three or five years, the limit depending upon the scholastic population of the district.6 Until recently, the only statutory guidance on
the employment of term contract teachers was this limitation on the
length of the contract term; however, in 1981, the legislature adopted
the Term Contract Nonrenewal Act (hereinafter referred to as
TCNA).7
Prior to TCNA's enactment, a term contract had to be affirmatively
renewed at the end of each contract term. In contrast, pursuant to
the new statute, a teacher's term contract is automatically renewed
unless the district timely initiates nonrenewal procedures.' This Act
2. See id. § 13.110 (Vernon Supp. 1985) (release of continuing contract teacher at end of
year); id. § 21.203 (term contract nonrenewal). In Chapter 13, "release," as opposed to "nonrenewal," is used to describe the cessation of a teacher's employment at the end of the school

year in a continuing contract district. See id. § 13.110.
3. See id. § 21.201(4).
4. See id. § 13.106 (Vernon 1972).

5. See id. § 21.201(4) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
6. Compare id. § 23.28(b) (Vernon 1972) (districts with population less than 5000 shall
not have contract term exceeding three years) with id. § 23.28(c) (districts with population
greater than 5000 shall not have contract term exceeding five years).

7. See id. §§ 21.201-.211 (Vernon Supp. 1985) ("Subchapter G. Teachers' Employment
Contracts"). Subchapter G applies not only to teachers, but to all full-time term contract

employees of a district who are required to hold a valid certificate or teaching permit, except
para-professionals. See id. § 21.201(1), (4).
8. Compare Carl v. South San Antonio Indep. School Dist., 561 S.W.2d 560, 563-64 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Waco 1978, writ refd n.r.e.) (no implied renewal due to school districts, delayed
termination) and Hix v. Tuloso-Midway Indep. School Dist., 489 S.W.2d 706, 710-11 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (automatic contract renewal void in term
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further requires the districts utilizing term contracts to adopt policies
establishing the reasons that will support a decision not to renew a
teacher's employment at the end of his contract term.9 Additionally,
the Act establishes procedures for notice, hearings, and appeals of
nonrenewal decisions,' ° and requires formalized evaluation of teachers during the school year. 1 '
Continuing contract districts employ teachers under sections
13.101 to 13.116 of the Texas Education Code. 12 Enacted in 1967,
this statute provides a formalized tenure system for a district choosing
to have probationary and continuing contracts.1 3 A teacher, under
this statute, serves a probationary period of not more than four years
before obtaining continuing contract status. 4 When continuing contract status is achieved, the employment relationship continues automatically without the necessity of nomination and school board
approval.' 5 Thereafter, the employment relationship is severed only if
the teacher resigns, retires, or the district affirmatively initiates the6
teacher's termination, nonrenewal, or return to probationary status.'
C. Probationaryversus Tenured Teacher

The final factor to consider in analyzing the procedural requirements for teacher termination is a determination of the teacher's concontract districts) with TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.204(b) (Vernon Supp. 1985) (teacher
employed in same capacity if board fails to give proper notice).
9. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.03 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
10. See id. §§ 21.204-.207.

11. See id. § 21.202.

12. See id. §§ 13.101-.116 (Vernon 1972) ("Subchapter C. Teachers' Employment Contracts") (amendments to §§ 13.110, 13.112(e), and 13.115(c), (d) are codified in Vernon Supp.
1985).
13. See id. § 13.101 (Vernon 1972). The probationary or continuing contract statute "applies only to teachers employed after its effective date; and then only if the school board adopts
the tenure plan." See Garcia v. Pharr, San Juan, Alamo Indep. School Dist., 513 S.W.2d 636,

640 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
14. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 13.102 (Vernon 1972). Normally, a probationary contract may only be for a term not exceeding three years; however, if the board of trustees has
some doubt about a teacher's abilities, they may, by affirmative action, extend the probationary
period to four years. See id.
15. See id. § 13.107.
16. See id. § 13.107(l)-(5). The board of trustees may rescind its adoption of subchapter
C. See Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. MW-238 (1980). If the board does rescind its adoption of
continuing contracts, employees with valid continuing contracts executed prior to the rescission will continue to be employed under the provisions of subchapter C until the specified
conditions for termination occur. See id.
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tractual status. In Texas, under either a term or continuing contract
system, a teacher's status can be either probationary or tenured.' 7 In
a term contract district, a probationary period for new teachers must
be affirmatively established'" and cannot exceed the teacher's first two
years of continuous employment. 9 School districts utilizing continuing contracts, on the other hand, are required by law to offer first time
teachers probationary contracts which cannot exceed three years absent action by the district's board of trustees. 20 In the continuing contract system those teachers who are not on probationary status must
be regarded as tenured. 2

II.
A.

REASONS FOR TERMINATION

Continuing Contract Districts

The Education Code provides the only permissible grounds for the
termination of a continuing contract teacher.22 The statutory grounds
for mid-year terminations are limited to those instances involving
"immorality,23 conviction of a felony or other crime involving moral
17. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 13.102, .107, 21.209 (Vernon 1972 & Supp. 1985).
18. See id. § 21.209 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
19. See id. § 21.209.
20. See id. § 13.102 (Vernon 1972). Section 13.108 does permit a district to grant an
administrator continuing contract status without the necessity of a probationary contract. See
id. § 13.108.
21. See id. § 13.106. If the board of trustees elects the teacher to employment status
during the teacher's last probationary year, then an offer is to be made to the teacher which he
must accept within 30 days or refusal will be implied. See id. § 13.106.
22. See id. § 13.109. An additional reason added in the last special session of the Texas
Legislature will be the failure to pass the teacher competency test by June 30, 1986. See id.
§ 13.047(d)-(g) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
23. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 13.109(1) (Vernon 1972). The courts in Texas have
held that immorality "is that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless and which shows
a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community."
See Searcy v. State Bar, 604 S.W.2d 256, 258 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1980, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); see also Muniz v. State, 575 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus Christi 1978,
writ ref'd n.r.e.). The termination of a teacher based upon immoral conduct was upheld where
the teacher engaged in illicit sexual activity. See Ros v. Springfield School Dist., 691 P.2d 509,
511-12 (Or. Ct. App. 1984) (teacher caught with his pants down in arcade booth). "'Immorality' may and often does include sexual misconduct but it is much broader in meaning and
scope." In re Flannery's Appeal, 178 A.2d 751, 753 (Pa. 1962). A teacher who called a 14year-old female student a "slut" and a "prostitute" was properly dismissed for immoral conduct. See Bovino v. Board of School Directors, 377 A.2d 1284, 1287, 1289 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1977); see also Balog v. McKeesport Area School Dist., 484 A.2d 198, 200 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1984) ("[i]mmoral conduct may include lying").
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turpitude, 24 drunkenness, 25 repeated failure to comply with official directives and official school board policies, 26 physical or mental incapacity preventing performance2 of the contract,27 [and] repeated and
continuing neglect of duties."
The statutory reasons for discharge are broad in scope, making
them as important for the possible justifications they eliminate from
consideration as for the guidance they give districts and teachers as to
specific factual instances permitting termination. The most important

24. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 13.109(2) (Vernon 1972). Public lewdness, a Class A
misdemeanor, is considered "to be a crime involving moral turpitude." See Green v. County
Attorney, 592 S.W.2d 69, 71 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, no writ). "'Moral Turpitude' is
defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a
man owes to his fellow men or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary
rule of right and duty between man and man." See id. at 71; see also Muniz v. State, 575
S.W.2d 408, 411 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Under Georgia law,
which limits dismissals to crimes involving moral turpitude, a school principal was properly
terminated after he was convicted of submitting false documents to the Internal Revenue Service. See Logan v. Warren County Bd. of Educ., 549 F. Supp. 145, 148 (S.D. Ga. 1982).
25. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 13.109(3) (Vernon 1972). Can the school district terminate a teacher based upon drunken behavior outside the scope of the teacher's employment?
The Supreme Court of Tennessee reinstated a teacher whose dismissal was based upon a DWI
conviction. See Turk v. Franklin Special School Dist., 640 S.W.2d 218, 219-20 (Tenn. 1982)
(absence of charge that teacher had alcohol problem made notice to teacher defective). The
court, however, went on to state, in dicta, that a single DWI conviction might in some circumstances be sufficient to support the dismissal of a tenured teacher. See id. at 221.
26. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 13.109(4) (Vernon 1972). A teacher's own "testimony
that his method of teaching was better than the prescribed curriculum and that the administrative directives. . . violated academic freedom .. ,[could] not overcome the ample testimony
in the record of the [teacher's] repeated failures to comply with official directives .... " See
McConnell v. Alamo Heights Indep. School Dist., 576 S.W.2d 470, 478 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Excessive disciplinary referrals after an administrative letter
suggesting remedial actions, along with failure to comply with administrative letters concerning neglect to comply with prescribed curriculum, are sufficient grounds for teacher termination. See id.at 473.
27. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 13.109(5) (Vernon 1972). "Incapacity is incurred by a
workman when his injury prevents him from performing the usual tasks of his job." Travelers
Ins. Co. v. Smith, 435 S.W.2d 248, 249 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1968, writ dism'd) (workman's compensation case). "Total incapacity occurs when a workman is disabled by injury to
such extent he can not procure and retain employment at labor of the class he was performing
when injured .... " Id. at 249; see also Bradley v. Cothern, 384 F. Supp. 1216, 1222 (E.D.
Tex. 1974) (teacher can be forced to discontinue services when physically unable to continue
due to pregnancy).
28. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 13.109(6) (Vernon 1972). Failure to maintain classroom management and discipline is considered neglect of duties. See McConnell v. Alamo
Heights Indep. School Dist., 576 S.W.2d 470, 473, 480 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1979,
writ refd n.r.e.) (teacher referred 147 disciplinary problems to administration while next highest number of referrals was 43).
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lesson to be learned from section 13.109 is that, in the area of job
performance, a grievous single incident will not justify discharge.2 9
Because the statute uses "repeated" and "continuing" in discussing
the performance of duties and the following of policies and directives,
school officials should be wary of discharging an employee for unsatisfactory performance unless there is documented history of job-related
deficiencies.30 School administrators should be encouraged to keep
complete and accurate records of a teacher's performance and nonperformance rather than having to recall prior instances of inadequate
performance for which no warnings were given and about which no
records were made.31 Such an accurate review process not only aids
the district in meeting the requirements of section 13.109, but works
to the teacher's advantage in that it gives the teacher advance knowledge of problems and, therefore, an opportunity to correct any
deficiencies.
B.

Term ContractDistricts

Statutory guidance regarding the grounds for discharge of term
contract teachers is almost nonexistent. The only guidance provided
for termination during the term of a teacher's contract is: "Nothing
in this subchapter shall prohibit a board of trustees from
discharging
32
a teacher for cause during the term of the contract.
The statute permits the widest of latitudes in terminating a term
contract teacher and does not require the district to adopt policies
stating the grounds for which the board will discharge a teacher during the term of the contract. This absence is confusing in light of the
TCNA's requirement that a school board adopt reasons for a
29. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 13.109(4) (Vernon 1972) (requires "repeated failure");

id. § 13.109(6) (requires "repeated and continuing neglect").
30. See McConnell v. Alamo Heights Indep. School Dist., 576 S.W.2d 470, 473 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1979, writ refd n.r.e.) (administration presented letters and critical reports of teacher's performance as evidence for termination).
31. There are many instances in which administrators are required to keep written performance evaluations of school personnel. See, e.g., TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 13.301-.304
(Vernon Supp. 1985) (appraisal process and performance criteria for teachers); id. § 21.202
(written evaluation of each teacher required on annual basis); Tex. Educ. Agency, 10 Tex. Reg.
270 (1985) (to be codified at 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 149.41(c)(1)) (appraisal of teacher's
performance shall be summarized in one final report placed into teacher's personnel file). Administrators, however, have a tendency to give teachers positive or high marks to boost their
morale or to avoid confrontations centered around the evaluation; thus, these evaluations
sometimes offer little help to administrators seeking the nonrenewal of an incompetent teacher.
32. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.210 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
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teacher's nonrenewal.33 For some unexplained reason, a district is
permitted by statute, when contemplating termination during the contract term, to make a post-incident determination
of whether the rea4
discharge.1
for
"cause"
constituted
sons
Valid "cause" for termination under term contracts would certainly
include the reasons for mid-year termination previously discussed in
continuing contract districts.3 5 Additionally, a single incident of jobrelated misconduct could justify discharge in a term contract district
although it would not constitute sufficient cause in a continuing contract district. The existence of cause for termination of
a term con36
basis.
case-by-case
a
on
judged
be
must
tract employee
In Drown v. PortsmouthSchool District,37 the First Circuit held that
a school board's determination of cause could be overturned as arbitrary and capricious only if (1) it was based on a reason totally unrelated to the educational process, (2) was totally unsupported by facts,
or (3) it was so trivial as to bear no relation to the action taken by the
district or the official.3" Subsequent federal decisions question
whether there is any such independent federal cause of action for an
arbitrary or capricious termination. 39 These decisions adopt a more
33. See id. § 21.203(b) ("board of trustees of each school district shall establish policies
consistent with this subchapter which shall establish the reasons for nonrenewal").
34. Compare id. § 21.210 (district can simply terminate for cause) with id. § 21.203(b)
(district must establish written guidelines for nonrenewal actions).
35. See id. § 13.109 (Vernon 1972).
36. See id. § 21.210 (Vernon Supp. 1985). " 'For cause' " with respect to dismissal of
school teacher "presupposes right to hearing, notice and appeal." Freeman v. Gould Special
School Dist., 405 F.2d 1153, 1159 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 843 (1969); see also Napolitano v. Ward, 317 F. Supp. 79, 81 (N.D. Ill. 1970). The phrase "for cause" has been interpreted differently depending upon the jurisdiction hearing the case; in Louisiana, in order to
dismiss a police officer for cause, the evidence must show that termination was necessary for
discipline and efficiency or needed to avoid detriment to the department. See Martin v. City of
St. Martinville, 321 So. 2d 532, 535 (Ct. App. 1975), aff'd, 325 So. 2d 283 (La. 1976). In
Maryland, in order to remove a policeman for cause, the cause must affect or concern his
ability and fitness to perform the duty imposed on him. See Board of Street Comm'rs v. Williams, 53 A. 923, 925 (Md. 1903). In Missouri, the removal of a civil service employee for
cause implies some personal misconduct, or fact, rendering further employment harmful to the
public interest. See State v. Kansas City, 257 S.W. 197, 200 (Mo. Ct. App. 1923). In Montana, removal for cause requires "legal cause and not merely a cause which the appointing
power, in the exercise of discretion, may deem sufficient." See State v. O'Hern, 65 P.2d 619,
623 (Mont. 1937).
37. 451 F.2d 1106 (1st Cir. 1971).
38. See id. at 1108 (court held teacher's uncooperative nature sufficient to uphold
nonrenewal).
39. See Weathers v. West Yuma County School Dist., 530 F.2d 1335, 1339-40 (10th Cir.
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correct analysis, permitting the courts to examine only the proffered
reasons for termination in order to determine if they are mere pretexts
for some illegal or unconstitutional reason for the termination or nonrenewal.' This approach precludes the courts from attempting to
reevaluate the educational merits of a school official's judgment, but
would still protect a teacher's constitutional and statutory freedoms.

"Cause" has been found to exist in a wide variety of circumstances,
including: incompetency, 41 a teacher's insubordination and failure to
follow a supervisor's orders,42 a teacher being uncooperative and unwilling to carry out department policy,4 3 a teacher's failure to get
along with a superior,' a teacher causing disharmony in the department,45 improper sexual conduct of a teacher,46 and unauthorized
1976); Jeffries v. Turkey Run Consol. School Dist., 492 F.2d 1, 4-5 (7th Cir. 1974); Buhr y.
Buffalo Pub. School Dist., 509 F.2d 1196, 1202-03 (8th Cir. 1974).
40. Such an analysis would be comparable to the burden established in employment discrimination cases. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253
(1981).
41. See Osborne v. Bullitt County Bd. of Educ., 658 P.2d 860, 861 (Colo. 1983) (statute
not unconstitutionally vague where it provides for dismissal based upon incompetency).
School authorities could reasonably conclude that the teacher was inefficient and incompetent,
where the evidence would show that the teacher "did not adhere to her teaching schedule;...
failed to follow school policies; . . . evaluation reports [indicated] unsatisfactory [performance]; . . . [failed to] discipline her students and . . . was uncooperative" with her superiors.
See Conder v. Board of Directors, 567 S.W.2d 377, 379-80 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978). Terminations
have been held illegal, however, where no valid reasons were given, but only conclusions that
the teacher was incompetent and willfully neglected his or her duties, without specifying particu'lar acts constituting such conduct. See Serignet v. Livingston Parish School Bd., 282 So.
2d 761, 763 (La. Ct. App. 1973). Additionally, a termination based upon incompetency has
been held improper where there were minor discipline problems, some difficulty in communicating to parents and other faculty members, and a slight hygiene problem. See Hollingsworth
v. Board of Educ., 303 N.W.2d 506, 512 (Neb. 1981).
42. See Horton v. Orange County Bd. of Educ., 464 F.2d 536, 537-38 (4th Cir. 1972)
(teacher's refusal to obey orders "consisted of downright insubordination"). Insubordination
"includes the willful refusal of a teacher to obey the reasonable rules and regulations of his or
her employing board of education." See State v. Board of Educ., 40 So. 2d 689, 695 (Ala.
1949). Failure to fill out evaluation forms has been held to be insubordination. See Ray v.
Minneapolis Bd. of Educ., 202 N.W.2d 375, 378 (Minn. 1972). Teacher who deliberately and
deceitfully broke agreement not to use the novel Catcher In The Rye was properly terminated
for being insubordinate. See Harris v. Mechanicville Cent. School Dist., 394 N.Y.S.2d 302,
304 (App. Div. 1977), modified on other grounds, 380 N.E.2d 213, 408 N.Y.S.2d 384 (1978).
Striking the principal in the face and using profane language has also been held to be insubordination. See Mockler v. Ambach, 434 N.Y.S.2d 809, 811 (App. Div. 1980).
43. See Drown v. Portsmouth School Dist., 451 F.2d 1106, 1108 (lst Cir. 1971).
44. See Mockler v. Ambach, 434 N.Y.S.2d 809, 811 (App. Div. 1980).
45. See McEnteggart v. Cataldo, 451 F.2d 1109, 1111 (1st Cir. 1971) (threat to harmony
of department sufficient grounds for nonrenewal of contract), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 943 (1972).
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absences.47

III.
A.

REASONS FOR NONRENEWAL

Continuing Contract Districts

In continuing contract school districts, a distinction exists between
the reasons permitting nonrenewal or discharge of teachers with continuing contract status and those with probationary status. Teachers
with continuing contract status can only be released at the end of the
year for the same reasons which permit a mid-year termination and
for the following additional reasons:
1. incompetency in performance of duties;
2. failure to comply with such reasonable requirements as the board of
trustees of the employing school district may prescribe for achieving
professional improvement and growth;
3. willful failure to pay debts;
4. habitual use of addictive drugs or hallucinogens;
5. excessive use of alcoholic beverages;
6. necessary reduction of personnel by the school district (such reductions shall be made in the reverse order of seniority in the specific teaching fields);
7. for good cause as determined by the local school board, good cause
being the failure of a teacher to meet the accepted standards of conduct
for the profession as generally recognized and applied in similarly situated school districts throughout Texas; or
8. failure by a person required to take an examination under Section
13.047 of this code to perform satisfactorily on at least one examination
under that section on or before June 30, 1986.48
Teachers with probationary contracts in continuing contract districts, however, may be released at the end of the probationary contract if, in the judgment of the school board, "the best interests of the

46. See Gover v. Stoval, 35 S.W.2d 24, 25 (Ky. Ct. App. 1931) (teacher and student went
into school building for period exceeding one hour and never turned on lights). Usually an act
must be proven, but in Gover the court permitted an inference to be sufficient to prove an act.
See id. at 25.
47. See, e.g., Yuen v. Board of Educ., 222 N.E.2d 570, 571-72 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1966) (two
days of absence to attend meeting unrelated to education sufficient grounds for dismissal);
Fernald v. City of Ellsworth Superintending School Comm., 342 A.2d 704, 706, 708 (Me.
1975) (teacher two day absence for trip to Jamaica entitled school authorities to dismiss because teacher's services became unprofitable); Willis v. School Dist., 606 S.W.2d 189, 195 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1980) (excessive absences due to illegal strike sufficient grounds for dismissal).
48. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 13.110 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
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school district will be served .

.

. "' In most instances, the reasons

for nonrenewal of a probationary teacher will be those required for
nonrenewal of teachers with continuing contract status, but examples
of possible additional reasons for not renewing a probationary teacher
might be the ability to obtain a more highly qualified person to fill the
probationary teacher's position, personality conflicts with supervisors
or co-workers, or questions concerning the teacher's dedication or
teaching abilities which do not reach the level of incompetency.
B.

Term Contract Districts

Districts with term contracts are not statutorily limited to specific
reasons permitting nonrenewal, but are only required to adopt policies
"which shall establish reasons for nonrenewal." 0 The legislature,
however, recently required that these "reasons for nonrenewal must
include the failure

. . .

to take an examination under Section 13.047

of [the Education Code, or failure] to perform satisfactorily on at least
one examination under that section on or before June 30, 1986. ' 1
The emphasis under the statutory scheme for term contract teachers
is not to limit a district's discretion on this matter, but to require the
district to give the teachers some advance notice of the possible rea-2
sons that they may not have a job at the end of their contract term.1
While the advantages to this system certainly fall with the school district, it does at least require the school district to establish its own
individual tenure system which, in turn, gives the teacher a property
right in reemployment. In 1972 the United States Supreme Court in
Board of Regents v. Roth,13 required a procedurally correct hearing
for a nonrenewal decision only for a teacher possessing a propertied
or tenured right to reemployment, as opposed to fixed-term contract
teachers who only had an expectation of reemployment. 54 Because of
Roth, some districts were wary of adopting the tenure system established for continuing contract districts or any other semblence of a
tenure system since these systems would have automatically exposed
them to liability for failing to give a teacher a procedurally correct
49. See id. § 13.103 (Vernon 1972).
50. See id. § 21.203(b) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
51. See id. § 21.203(b).
52. See id. § 21.203(b).
53. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
54. See id. at 577 (person must have legitimate claim to property right in order to be
entitled to it).
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hearing." Now that term and continuing contract districts must both
afford procedurally correct hearings, the impetus to avoid any appearance of a tenure system is nonexistent.56
Finally, a term contract district is empowered to have a written
probationary status for teachers not to exceed two years, during
which time the provisions of the TCNA do not apply.57 During this
period, a probationary teacher's contract could be allowed to lapse for
any reason not prohibited by law, or as stated in the comparable section of the continuing contract statute, for "the best interests of the
school district .
IV.

58...
58

CONSTITUTIONALLY IMPERMISSIBLE REASONS FOR
DISCHARGE OR NONRENEWAL

Not only are school districts limited by law with respect to the reasons for which a teacher may be terminated during, or at the end of, a

school year or contract term, they are prohibited from taking adverse
action against an employee's status for constitutionally impermissible
reasons. When a constitutionally protected right is involved, there is
no distinction between nonrenewal and mid-year termination or between a term and continuing contract district. The employee's participation in political activity,5 9 public criticism of the school board or
administration practices, 6° race, 6 ' failure to abide by a dress code,6 2

55. See id. at 576-77 (tenured professor's employment safeguarded by due process); Perry
v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601-02 (1972) (tenure system could be implied from circumstances of employment).
56. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 21.203-.207 (Vernon Supp. 1985) (term contract
nonrenewal requirements); id. §§ 13.111, .112 (Vernon 1972 & Supp. 1985) (continuing contract termination requirements).
57. See id. § 21.209 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
58. See id. § 13.103 (Vernon 1972).
59. See Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d 177, 181 (4th Cir. 1966) (overturned nonrenewal
based upon teacher's activity in civil rights movement), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1003 (1967);
Guerra v. Roma Indep. School Dist., 444 F. Supp. 812, 820-21 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (district cannot fail to renew teacher's contract where nonrenewal is retaliation for teacher's political activity). Public employment cannot be rejected based upon the employee's failure to meet an
unreasonable condition, such as a waiver of his or her first amendment rights. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967) (membership in communist party not
sufficient grounds for dismissal); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1960) ("to compel a
teacher to disclose his every associational tie is to impair that teacher's right of free association"); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 190-91 (1952) (Oklahoma statute barring public
employees from associating with communist front organizations violates due process).
60. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574-75 (1968); Lusk v. Estes, 361 F.
Supp. 653, 660 (N.D. Tex. 1973) (overturned nonrenewal for criticism of school administra-
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expression of controversial views in class,6" and participation in a
teachers' union or association" have all been held to constitute constitutionally impermissible criteria for severing the employment
relationship.
A school district may not terminate a teacher when the sole reason
for the decision to sever the employment relationship is the exercise
by that teacher of a constitutionally protected right or activity.6 5 In
reality, however, a decision to sever the employment relationship normally involves a combination of reasons, only some of which might
fall within the category of constitutionally protected activity; or the
decision may involve the exercise of speech that in some manner affects the teacher's job performance. For example, when a teacher is
critical of a superior about the management of the school system, a
conflict arises between the district's right to maintain a cohesive staff
and a teacher's first amendment freedom to express his or her beliefs.
In Pickering v. Board of Education,66 the United States Supreme

tors). "Anybody who can size up a redheaded kid on the first day of school and tell whether to
put him on the front or back row can also size up the men in public office." J.B. SHEPPERD,
FREEDOM'S ADVOCATE 11 (1954).
61. See Harkless v. Sweeny Indep. School Dist., 554 F.2d 1353, 1357 (5th Cir.) (school
district failed to rehire 70% of black teachers while rehiring 100% of white teachers), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977). "Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to
show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause." Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous.
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977).
62. See Hander v. San Jacinto Junior College, 519 F.2d 273, 277 (5th Cir. 1975) (bearded
appearance could not be regulated). "School authorities may regulate teachers' appearance
and activities only when the regulation has some relevance to legitimate administrative or
educational functions." Id. at 277. A Texas court of appeals, prior to the Hander decision,
held that school officials "may adopt all reasonable rules and regulations ...
governing the
conduct and dress of teachers." See Ball v. Kerrville Indep. School Dist., 504 S.W.2d 791,
797-98 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.). However, the court concluded
that the State Board of Education properly overturned the termination of a teacher whose
termination was based upon the wearing of a Vandyke beard. See id. at 798-99.
63. See Sterzing v. Fort Bend Indep. School Dist., 496 F.2d 92, 93 (5th Cir. 1974) (district court found termination to violate teacher's right to "speak and express his opinion in the
classroom").
64. See Pred v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 415 F.2d 851, 854, 859 (5th Cir. 1969) (as long
as teacher does not agitate or propangandize within classroom, union activities protected). An
Illinois court, prior to the Pred decision, held that a teacher's participation in union activities
that interfered with his teaching responsibilities was sufficient ground for termination. See
Yuen v. Board of Educ., 222 N.E.2d 570, 572 (I11.App. Ct. 1966).
65. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1960); Avery v. Homewood City Bd. of
Educ., 674 F.2d 337, 341-42 (5th Cir. 1982) (discharge based upon pregnancy of unmarried
teacher violates equal protection clause).
66. 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). The Court faced a situation in which a teacher had been
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Court adopted a balancing test to determine which of these conflicting
rights should prevail.67 The Court held that public employers and
trial courts are required to examine each specific situation to determine whether the statement's effect upon the administration of the
school would justify restrictions on the teacher's right to participate
in public or private discussions of work-related issues.68
In Connick v. Meyers,6 9 the Supreme Court applied the Pickering
balancing test to a situation where a public employee was dismissed
because she circulated a petition surveying co-workers' concern over
working conditions in the district attorney's office. 7° The Court balanced the right of the employee to raise limited issues of public concern against the disruptive effect the petition had upon the internal
working relationships of the office. 7' The Court found the disruptive
effect, in this case, to outweigh the employee's right to raise these
issues. 72 In a termination proceeding against a teacher based upon the
teacher's statements or writings, the teacher's employment may be
terminated where the statements either represent insubordination that
materially affects the workings of the school or its environment, or
directly inhibit the teacher's performance of his or her duties.73
When a combination of permissible and illegal reasons support a

discharged because of writing a letter to a newspaper; the letter was critical of the school
board's prior attempts to raise school revenues and of the superintendent's attempts to prevent
teachers from opposing a proposed bond issue. See id. at 575-78 app. The board based its
decision on the rationale that the teacher's action was "detrimental to the best interests of the
schools." See id.at 567.
67. See id.at 568 (balance of interest between teacher as citizen and state as employer).
68. See id. at 570 n.3. The Court reviewed the employment relationship between the
teacher and the district's school board and its superintendent, and determined that the relationship was not direct or immediate and, therefore, "no question of maintaining either discipline by immediate superiors or harmony among coworkers" existed. See id. at 570.
Secondly, the Court looked at the nature of the published criticism of school financing and
found it to be of general public concern, about which the teacher's position should not remove
her from public debate since neither her teaching duties nor the school's administration would
be greatly impeded by the teacher's participation in the debate. See id. at 572-73.
69. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
70. See id. at 140-42. The survey included questions "concerning office transfer policy,
office morale, .... and whether employees felt pressured to work in political campaigns." See
id. at 141.
71. See id. at 147 (matters of personal concern in the work place have limited first amendment protection); id. at 151 (close working relationships important to efficient function of office operations).
72. See id.at 154.
73. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 570 n.3 (1968). "[A]bsent proof of
false statements knowingly or recklessly made by him, a teacher's exercise of his right to speak
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district's decision, courts are to apply the test adopted by the Supreme
Court in Mount Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle.7 4 Doyle
argued that his teaching contract had not been renewed because he
leaked information concerning the school to a local radio station, and
that nonrenewal on such grounds constituted a violation of his protected right to free speech."' In terminating Doyle, the school district
relied upon both the news-leaking incident and another incident in the
school cafeteria in which Doyle had made obscene gestures to students.76 The trial court found that Doyle's exercise of protected
rights had played a "substantial" part in the board's decision not to
renew Doyle's contract and held that Doyle must be reinstated with
back pay.7 7 The Supreme Court, reversing both the trial court and
the Sixth Circuit, held that a teacher can recover under a claim of
nonrenewal of a contract for constitutionally impermissible reasons
only if the school officials fail to prove that absent the protected conduct of a teacher, the same decision on renewal would have been
reached.7" Justice Rehnquist described the two separate issues involved in a claim of nonrenewal for impermissible reasons:
Initially, in this case, the burden was properly placed upon respondent
to show that his conduct was constitutionally protected, and that this
conduct was a "substantial factor"-or to put it in other words, that it
was a "motivating factor" in the Board's decision not to rehire him.
Respondent having carried that burden, however, the District Court
should have gone on to determine whether the Board had shown by a
preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision as to respondent's reemployment even in the absence of the protected conduct.7 9
By focusing on causation, the Court correctly protects the individual
from decisions which result from the improper consideration of constitutionally protected activity, but does not disturb the action taken

on issues of public importance may not furnish the basis for his dismissal from public employment." Id. at 574.
74. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
75. See id. at 283 (Doyle communicated information to local radio station that caused

undue concern in community).
76. See id. at 282 (in addition to utilizing obscene gesture, Doyle referred to students
involved in same incident as "sons of bitches").
77. See id. at 283.
78. See id. at 287.
79. Id. at 287.
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when the result would have been the same even if the protected activity had not been improperly considered.
V.

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS FOR TEACHER TERMINATION OR
NONRENEWAL

Although a school district may have proper reasons to support a
teacher's termination or nonrenewal, it must still afford the teacher
the proper procedure. If an unauthorized or impermissible reason is
the basis for the decision, no amount of correct procedure can make
the decision proper.80 Similarly, failure to grant a teacher the proper
procedure can invalidate a correct decision." Thus, knowledge of
how to sever the employment relationship is as important as knowledge and proof of the permissible reasons for the decision.
The fourteenth amendment of the Constitution provides that "[n]o
State shall.

. .

deprive any person of.

.

.property, without due pro-

cess of law."8 2 Because "property" is a broad term, the Supreme
Court has been forced to specifically define the particular property
interests protected by the fourteenth amendment.8 " Protected prop-

80. See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574-75 (1968); Hander v. San
Jacinto Junior College, 519 F.2d 273, 277 (5th Cir. 1975); Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d 177,
181 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1003 (1967).
81. Cf Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657-58 (1972). In Stanley, an Illinois statute
presumed that unwed fathers were unsuitable as parents. See id. at 649. Even though the
father may have been unfit as a parent, the denial of a hearing on his fitness made the state
action unconstitutional. See id. at 658. "Procedural due process is not intended to promote
efficiency or accommodate all possible interests; it is intended to protect the particular interests
of the person whose possessions are about to be taken." See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90
n.22 (1972).
82. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
83. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1971) (" '[liberty' and 'property'
are broad majestic terms"). The meaning of "property" as applied by the due process clause
"relate[s] to the whole domain of social and economic fact." See National Mutual Ins. Co. v.
Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The Supreme
Court has, on several occasions, specifically defined protected property interests. See Barry v.
Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 64 (1979) (horse racing training license); Memphis Light, Gas & Water
Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 18 (1978) (utility service); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332
(1976) (receipt of disability benefits); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 573-74 (1975) (high school
education); Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207, 208 (1971) (governmental employment);
Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971) (drivers license). Due process protection is dependent
upon whether the individual will suffer a grievous loss and does not depend upon whether the
"benefit is characterized as a 'right' or as a 'privilege.' " See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 481 (1972) (parole revocation case involving due process). In addition, "[tihe question is
not to merely the 'weight' of the individual's interest, but whether the nature of the interest is
one within the contemplation of the '. . . property language of the Fourteenth Amendment.' "
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erty interests do not "arise from" the Constitution, but are created
and defined by "existing rules or understandings that stem from an
independent source such as state law-rules or understandings that
secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those
benefits." 4 Therefore, the property interest Texas public school
teachers have in their employment, secured by the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment, is defined by reference to chapters 21
and 13 of the Texas Education Code and to local board policies and
practices."5

To deprive a person of a protected property interest, minimum procedural requirements must be followed. Just as property interests
cannot be defined without resort to state and federal laws, minimum
procedural due process cannot be determined without reference to the
applicable state and federal law and local school board policies. Ultimately, the Constitution defines the minimum procedural due process
for deprivation of a protected interest.8 6 In Arnett v. Kennedy,"7 a

plurality of the United States Supreme Court stated that an employee's property interest in the retention of employment exists only
to the extent it is protected by the procedural safeguards in the ordinance and rules governing their employment.8 8 Interpreting Arnett,
the Fifth Circuit reasoned that because six members of the court (a
majority) "rejected" this proposition, Arnett "must be read" as holdSee Jago v. Van Curen, 454 U.S. 14, 17 (1981); see also Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564, 570-71 (1972); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
84. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). Protected property interests
can be created and defined by state statutes or rules entitling citizens to certain benefits. See,
e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572-73 (1975); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601
(1972); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 86 (1972). "Any significant taking of property by the
state is within the purview of the due process clause." Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 86
(1972). "[A] temporary, nonfinal deprivation of property is nonetheless a 'deprivation' in
terms of the Fourteenth Amendment." See id. at 84-85.
85. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 21.201-.211 (Vernon Supp. 1985); id. §§ 13.101-.116
(Vernon 1972 & Supp. 1985). A de facto tenure policy can be established from officially
promulgated "rules and understandings." See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972).
However, a mere "unilateral expectation," or "abstract need, or desire" will not suffice to
establish a constitutionally protected interest. See Diggles v. Corsicana Indep. School Dist.,
529 F. Supp. 169, 174 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (teacher's aide not reemployed after several years of
service).
86. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971); City of Houston v. Fore, 401
S.W.2d 921, 923 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1966), afl'd, 412 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. 1967).
87. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
88. Compare id. at 151 (statute defines procedures to be used) with id. at 185 (White, J.,
concurring in part & dissenting in part) (notice and hearing required by Constitution).
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ing that while the state has the power to define a "property interest"
within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment, it is the Constitution which defines the minimum procedures necessary to safeguard
against deprivation of that protected interest.8 9 The Fifth Circuit
concluded that a public employer may not relieve itself from due process responsibilities by promulgating procedures for termination
which fall short of constitutional due process guarantees. 90 Recently,
the United States Supreme Court confirmed the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of Arnett; thus, a public employer is required to comply with
the Constitutional minimum due process requirements despite the
fact that state procedural requirements for termination are less onerous than the Constitutional requirements. 9 By contrast, where the
state law or local policies add to the minimum procedural protection
afforded by the Constitution, due process requires the district to comply with the local requirements, as well as the federal constitutional
92
requirements.
Constitutional minimum procedural due process requires that any
deprivation of a property interest must "be preceded by notice and an
opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case." 9 3 Two
issues arise from this simple statement: (1) the content and timing of
the notice and (2) the type and timing of the hearing.9 4
With respect to proper notice, the Fifth Circuit addressed this issue

89. See Thurston v. Dekle, 531 F.2d 1264, 1271 (5th Cir. 1976), vacated, 438 U.S. 901

(1978).
90. See id. at 1271-72.
91. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, L. Ed. 2d

-,

-

U.S..... 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1491-93,

-

(1985).

92. See Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852, 856 (5th Cir. 1970).
93. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975) (emphasis added); see also Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972); Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306, 314-15 (1950). "The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be
heard and it is 'an opportunity which must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'" Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 540 (1981) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380
U.S. 545, 552 (1965)); see also Shawgo v. Spradlin, 701 F.2d 470, 480 (5th Cir. 1983); Cunningham v. Parkdale Bank, 660 S.W.2d 810, 813 (Tex. 1983). "The purpose of notice... is
to apprise the affected individual of, and permit adequate preparation for, an impending 'hearing.'" Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 14 (1978); see also Cunningham v. Parkdale Bank, 660 S.W.2d 810, 813 (Tex. 1983).
94. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) ("once it is determined that due
process applies, the question remains what process is due"). "In general, the procedural protections required by the due process clause vary according to the demands of the particular
situation." Smith v. Estelle, 445 F. Supp. 647, 655 (N.D. Tex. 1977), affid, 602 F.2d 694 (5th
Cir. 1979), afid, 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
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in Ferguson v. Thomas,95 wherein the court had an occasion to outline
the notice required when terminating a teacher for cause.96 To meet
constitutional muster, notice must:
1. advise the teacher of the "cause or causes for his termination in
sufficient detail to fairly enable him to show any error that may exist"; 97 and
2. advise the teacher of the "names and the nature of the testimony of the witnesses against him." 98
In Texas, the question arises whether it is sufficient for a district to
notify a teacher of his proposed termination by merely listing the statutory reasons for termination in the teacher's notice. Such a list
would probably be sufficient to meet state law requirements.99
Broadly assigning a statutory reason for an individual's termination,
however, may not contain sufficient detail to enable a teacher to properly respond to the allegations against him and, thus, fail constitutional muster. Likewise, there is no requirement under state law that
the teacher be advised of the names and the nature of the testimony of
the witnesses against him.1°°
It is clear that due process requires notice to be given, but there is a
sub-issue as to when such notice must be given. In dicta, the Ferguson
court stated that the employer is not required in every case to set out
in its initial notice all of the details regarding the reasons for discharge. 10 The court suggested that minimum procedural due process
02
only requires notice that termination for cause is being proposed.1
If the teacher proceeds to challenge the termination, then the employer must express its allegations in greater detail and provide the
teacher with the names of the witnesses and the nature of the testi95. 430 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1970).

96. See id. at 856.
97. See id. at 856. Notice to the teacher's attorney will be imputed to the teacher under
§ 13.103 of the Education Code. See Canutillo Indep. School Dist. v. Kennedy, 673 S.W.2d
407, 409 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
98. See Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852, 856 (5th Cir. 1970). Where the board suspends a teacher awaiting a hearing on termination, notice of an emergency meeting of the
board of trustees will only have to substantially comply with the requirements of the open
meetings law. See McConnell v. Alamo Heights Indep. School Dist., 576 S.W.2d 470, 474-75
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1979, writ ref d n.r.e.) (where it is just suspension, notice must
meet requirements of open meetings law and not requirements for teacher termination).
99. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 13.109, .11l(a) (Vernon 1972).
100. See id.§ 13.111(a).
101. See Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852, 856 (5th Cir. 1970).
102. See id. at 856.
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mony that will be offered in support of the proposed action. 10 3
Though minimum constitutional procedural due process may only require the initial notice to communicate the proposed action, state law
additionally requires this notice to state the grounds.'" Therefore,
Texas law, by requiring at least an outline of the grounds for the proposed action, adds to the minimum constitutional due process guarantees as discussed in Ferguson.105

With respect to a proper hearing, minimum constitutional requirements demand that before an employee may be deprived of his property interest, the hearing must:
10 6
1. take place at a reasonable time after proper notice is given;
2. afford the teacher a "meaningful opportunity" to defend him or
herself; and'0 7
3. take place before a tribunal that "possesses some academic expertise and an apparent impartiality toward the charges." 108
Regarding the last requirement (3), an issue is raised when the
school board utilizes its counsel during the hearing to act as both
prosecutor and advisor to the board on questions concerning evidence
and procedure.

09

Whether the prosecutor's advice to the presiding

103. See id. at 856; cf Lowrance v. Barker, 347 F. Supp. 588, 593 (E.D. Tex. 1972), af'd,
480 F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1973).
104. See TEX. Eouc. CODE ANN. § 13.111 (a) (Vernon 1972) (notice of "proposed action
and of the grounds assigned therefor"); id. § 21.204(c) (Vernon Supp. 1985) (notice "shall
contain a statement of all the reasons").
105. See Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852, 856-57 (5th Cir. 1970).
106. See id. at 856 (emphasis added). Texas law seems to require that the hearing, if
requested, must take place before the proposed termination or nonrenewal. Cf TEX. EDUC.
CODE ANN. § 13.113 (Vernon 1972). Some federal courts have sustained, in some circumstances, the constitutionality of a post-termination evidentiary hearing, provided that the employee is given pre-termination notice with specific reasons and is given a reasonable time to
respond both in writing and orally to the official or official body charged with making termination decisions. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971); Thurston v. Dekle, 531
F.2d 1264, 1272-73 (5th Cir. 1976), vacated, 438 U.S. 901 (1978); Davis v. Vandiver, 494 F.2d
830, 832-33 (5th Cir. 1975); Johnson v. San Jacinto Junior College, 498 F. Supp. 555, 570-71
(S.D. Tex. 1980).
107. See Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852, 856 (5th Cir. 1970). The type and timing of
the hearing "will depend on appropriate accommodation of the competing interests involved."
See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975); see also Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455
U.S. 422, 434 (1982).
108. See Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852, 856 (5th Cir. 1970). "The nature of a due
process hearing is shaped by the 'risk of error inherent in the truthfinding process as applied to
the generality of cases, not the rare exceptions.' " Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 696
(1979) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976)).
109. "Due process demands impartiality on the part of those who function in judicial or
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officer of the hearing taints the impartiality of the board is an issue
that has yet to be resolved."'
A.

Term Contract Districts

Section 21.203(b) of the Texas Education Code provides that the
board of trustees of each school district must promulgate board policies establishing reasons for the nonrenewal of a teacher's term contract."' In addition, the board must adopt policies and procedures
for receiving recommendations from the school administration for the
nonrenewal of teacher term contracts." 2 Section 21.204 provides that
when the board receives a nonrenewal recommendation from the administration, it must consider this recommendation in conjunction
with written evaluations required by section 21.202." ' If the board
chooses to accept a recommendation, it must give the teacher written
notice of the "proposed" nonrenewal no later than the first of
April
1 14
contract.
term
teacher's
the
of
termination
natural
the
before
The written notice required by state law specifies only that the notice shall contain a statement of the grounds for such proposed action. 1' This notice requirement is not difficult to meet under state
law; however, minimum procedural due process, as required by the
Constitution of the United States, may, in some circumstances, requasi-judicial capacities." Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195 (1982); see also Marshall
v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1980); Brown v. United States, 377 F. Supp. 530, 539
(N.D. Tex. 1974).
110. Participation by a school district's attorney in a student disciplinary proceeding in
such a dual capacity has been held constitutional. See Tasby v. Estes, 643 F.2d 1103, 1106
(5th Cir. 1981). "The involvement of the school district's attorney in the disciplinary proceedings does not necessarily endanger the impartiality and integrity of the fact-finding process."
Id. at 1106; cf Murray v. West Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 472 F.2d 438, 443 (5th Cir.
1973) ("Due process in the schools does not require that a court of law be convened to hear
every [student] suspension.")
11. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.203(b) (Vernon Supp. 1985). The rights of term
teachers prior to 1981 are discussed in Wells v. Independent School District, 736 F.2d 243,
251-55 (5th Cir. 1984).
112. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.203(c) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
113. See id. § 21.204(a).
114. See id. § 21.204(a). The teacher waives any objection to the board's failure to meet
the April 1 deadline by merely requesting a hearing as outlined in § 21.205 of the Education
Code. See Barich v. San Felipe Del Rio Consol. Indep. School Dist., 653 S.W.2d 329, 330
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ). The teacher can seek an injunction to extend his 10
day notice requirement for requesting a hearing. See id. at 330-31 (injunction permitted when
teacher complained of sufficiency of notice received regarding his nonrenewal).
115. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.204(c) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
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quire a more detailed notice than that required by state law. 1 16 If the
board should fail to give proper and timely written notice of the proposed nonrenewal, the board shall be bound to employ
the teacher in
1 17
year.
following
the
for
capacity
same
her
or
his
Term contract teachers have a protected property interest in the
balance of their contract; thus, the federal constitution requires that
118
they be provided procedural due process prior to termination.
Although not dictated by state law, minimum due process guarantees
would necessitate following the procedures outlined in sections 21.205
through 21.207 when discharging a teacher "for cause" during the
term of the contract. 119 However, chapter 21 excludes probationary
teachers in a term contract district from its procedural requirements. 120 A term contract district that adopts a probationary period
would not have to give such a teacher a hearing on a nonrenewal
decision unless
its own rules provide such a procedure or grant a form
121
of tenure.
If a term contract teacher desires a hearing upon notice of nonrenewal or notice of termination for cause, he must give written notice
122
to the board of trustees within ten days after receiving the notice.

116. See Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852, 856 (5th Cir. 1970).
117. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.204(b) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
118. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576 (1972).
119. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972) (local rules and understandings
can establish procedural due process).
120. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.209 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
121. Compare id. (provisions of chapter 21, subchapter G do not apply to probationary
term teachers) with Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1977) (rights created by
existing rules and understandings). The Austin court of appeals upheld a district court's refusal to grant a probationary term contract employee a temporary injunction to restrain a
school district from nonrenewing his position. See Bormaster v. Lake Travis Indep. School
Dist., 668 S.W.2d 491, 494 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, no writ). The employee complained that
he was given defective written notice of the proposed action. See id. at 493. The court held
that the employee could not establish a "probable right to recover," so as to warrant issuance
of a temporary injunction, when, as a probationary employee, he did not show that he is "entitled to complain of any alleged defective notice." See id. at 493-94. Compare id. at 494 (temporary injunction to protest defective notice denied to probationary employee) with Barich v.
San Felipe Del Rio Consol. Indep. School Dist., 653 S.W.2d 329, 331 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1983, no writ) (injunctive relief to protest defective notice available to term contract
employee).
122. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.205(a) (Vernon Supp. 1985). By requesting a
hearing under § 21.205, the teacher waives rights as to defects in notice. See Barich v. San
Felipe Del Rio Consol. Indep. School Dist., 653 S.W.2d 329, 330 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1983, no writ). Because a teacher is placed in the untenable position of either obtaining his
right to hearing, thus waiving an attack on the notice, or foregoing the hearing and relying
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If a hearing is requested, the board must hold a hearing no later than
fifteen days after receipt of the teacher's request.1 23 The hearing will
be closed unless the teacher requests an open hearing. 124 To conform
with the subchapter addressing term contracts, the board must adopt
rules regarding the conduct of hearings.1 25 If a teacher does not request a hearing within ten days after receiving his or her written notice, the board can act on the administration's recommendation and
must notify the teacher of the action no later than fifteen days after
the expiration of the ten day period within which the teacher might
126
have requested a hearing.
After a properly requested and conducted hearing, the board must
notify the teacher of its decision not later than fifteen days after the
hearing takes place. 127 The statute does not require the written notice
to contain anything more than notice of the action taken.1 28 This is in
contrast to the notice of the "proposed" nonrenewal, which must con' 129
tain a "statement of all the reasons for such proposed action."
The teacher may appeal the board action to the state commissioner
of education. 3° The review by the commissioner of education concerning nonrenewal will be governed by the substantial evidence rule,
and the commissioner may only overturn the decision of the board of
trustees upon a finding that the board action was "arbitrary, capricious, unlawful or not supported by substantial evidence." 31 In con-

solely upon an argument of defective notice, a temporary restraining order or temporary injunction may be had in order to delay the board of trustees meeting, where the teacher challenges the notice requirement. See id. at 331 (injunctive relief available to postpone 10 day
notice requirement).
123. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.205(a) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
124. See id.
125. See id. § 21.205(b).
126. See id. § 21.206(a).
127. See id. § 21.206(b).
128. See id. § 21.206(b).
129. Compare id. § 21.206(b) (board should notify employee of action taken) with id.
§ 21.204(c) (notice shall contain statement of all reasons).
130. See id. §§ 11.13, 21.207(a); Tex. Educ. Agency, 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 157.1(b)(1) (Shepard's May 1, 1982) (Nature of Hearings and Appeals).
131. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.207(a) (Vernon Supp. 1985); Tex. Educ. Agency,
8 Tex. Reg. 2759, 2759 (1983) (to be codified at 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 157.64). The party
appealing the decision of the board of trustees has an onerous burden to overcome. See McConnell v. Alamo Heights Indep. School Dist., 576 S.W.2d 470, 475-76 (Tex. Civ. App.-San

Antonio 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); McRae v. Lindale Indep. School Dist., 450 S.W.2d 118, 12122 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1970, writ refd n.r.e.). The commissioner's review is limited to the
record; however, agency regulations permit the submission of new evidence to the commis-
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trast, for teacher terminations, the commissioner of education will
32
provide a de novo hearing at no expense to the parties involved.1 If
the teacher is further aggrieved by the decision of the commissioner of
education, the teacher may then appeal to a Travis County district
33
court.
B.

Continuing ContractDistricts

As discussed previously, first time teachers in districts utilizing continuing contracts are initially employed under probationary contracts.1" 4 Chapter 13 of the Education Code, in addition to
addressing termination of continuing contract teachers, also provides

sioner where such evidence is material and its absence at the original hearing is excused by
good cause. See Tex. Educ. Agency, 8 Tex. Reg. 2759, 2759 (1983) (to be codified at 19 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE § 157.64(b)). Additionally, the commissioner may conduct a de novo hearing
where it is found that the board of trustees failed to provide the employee with a proper hearing, as required by § 21.205(a) of the Texas Education Code. See Calderon v. Texas Educ.
Agency, No. 346,494 (Dist. Ct. of Travis County, 250th Judicial Dist. of Texas, Nov. 4, 1983)
(judgment). But cf TEX. R. Civ. P. 452(f) ("unpublished opinions shall not be cited as authority by counsel or by a court").
132. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 11.13(a) (Vernon Supp. 1985); Tex. Educ. Agency, 9
Tex. Reg. 4179, 4179 (1984) (to be codified at 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 157.50-.60). "Section
21.207, the term contract appeal provision, is not specifically limited to nonrenewal; however,
its positioning within subchapter G., in relationship to section 21.210, the term contract termination provision, would seem to exclude the use of section 21.207 in termination cases in favor
of the general appeal provision of section 11.13." Telephone interview with Mark Robinett,
Director of Hearings and Appeals for the Texas Education Agency (Mar. 22, 1985) (de novo
hearing for termination of term contract teacher). "In addition, prior to the enactment of
Subchapter G, termination cases were heard by the Commissioner on a de novo basis pursuant
to section 11. 13; nothing in section 21.207 purports to have changed any aspect of terminating
the employment of term contract teachers." Id.; cf Tex. Educ. Agency, 8 Tex. Reg, 2759,
2759-60 (1983) (to be codified at 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 157.64) (agency's rule for "Appeals
Brought Pursuant to the Term Contract Nonrenewal Act," is limited to nonrenewal situations
and makes no reference to terminations under § 21.210).
133. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.207(b) (Vernon Supp. 1985). The Administrative
Procedure and Texas Register Act (APTRA) requires that a person exhaust all administrative
remedies before seeking judicial review of the agency's decision. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 6252-13a, § 19(a) (Vernon Supp. 1985). The Administrative Code provides a procedure for the filing of motions for rehearing upon decisions of the commissioner of education.
See Tex. Educ. Agency, 9 Tex. Reg. 4179, 4179 (1984) (to be codified at 19 TEX. ADMIN.
CODE § 157.62). The Corpus Christi court of appeals has held that the filing of a motion for
rehearing within the 15 day time limitation is a required prerequisite to an appeal to the district court. See Butler v. State Bd. of Educ., 581 S.W.2d 751, 755 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1979, writ ref d n.r.e.). See generally Hill & Kent, Administrative Law, 34 Sw. L.J.
471, 476-78 (1980); Comment, Administrative Law: Journey Through the Administrative Process and JudicialReview of Administrative Actions, 16 ST. MARY'S L.J. 155, 173-81 (1984).
134. See supra text accompanying note 20.
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the procedural requirements for terminating teachers employed on a
probationary basis.' 35 A probationary contract teacher does not have
a protected property interest under the fourteenth amendment in the
renewal of his contract; 136 thus, minimum procedural due process
does not require written notice of the reasons for nonrenewal. 137 The
type of notice required is controlled by state statute, and to determine

the extent of this notice, a distinction must be made between the nonrenewal of a probationary contract and the termination of a probationary contract.131 Section 13.111 of the Education Code articulates
the notice required when terminating probationary teachers in a continuing contract district. 13 This section requires written notice with a
statement of reasons when a teacher is dismissed during the year or
"at the end of a school year but before the end of the term fixed in his
contract."'" However, if a teacher is dismissed at the natural expiration of his or her probationary contract (nonrenewal), section 13.103
controls, and written notification with stated reasons to terminate

135. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 13.102-.105 (Vernon 1972).
136. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 n.6, 578 n.16 (1972); Bowen v.
Calallen Indep. School Dist., 603 S.W.2d 229, 234-35 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980,
writ refd n.r.e.).
137. See Bormaster v. Lake Travis Indep. School Dist., 668 S.W.2d 491, 494 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1984, no writ). If local policies are established which create a notice procedure,
then those policies should be followed if they exceed the statutory requirements. See Bowen v.
Calallen Indep. School Dist., 603 S.W.2d 229, 233 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ
ref'd n.r.e.). Several courts prior to Roth held that a non-tenured public employee has no right
to a statement of reasons for nonrenewal. See Orr v. Trinter, 444 F.2d 128, 134-35 (6th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 943 (1972); Jones v. Hopper, 410 F.2d 1323, 1329 (10th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 991 (1970); Freeman v. Gould Special School Dist., 405 F.2d
1153, 1160-61 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 843 (1969).
138. Not only is there a statutory distinction between the notice required for termination
and nonrenewal, but such a distinction has been determinative in the evaluation of many local
board policies and rules pertaining to teacher contracts. See White v. South Park Indep.
School Dist., 693 F.2d 1163, 1166 (5th Cir. 1982) ("[W]ritten policies and regulations of the
Board establish a procedure for the dismissal of an employee, but say nothing about the decision to renew a teacher's contract."). Where, for instance, a board policy has established the
notice required for termination, such notice will not control in teacher nonrenewal cases. See
id.; Moore v. Knowles, 377 F. Supp. 302, 304, 308 (N.D. Tex. 1974) (board policy applied only
to termination), aff'd, 512 F.2d 72 (5th Cir. 1975); Clutts v. Southern Methodist Univ., 626
S.W.2d 334, 336 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1981, writ refd n.r.e.) (university bylaw provision did
not override one-year appointment, as professor "without tenure"); Bowen v. Calallen Indep.
School Dist., 603 S.W.2d 229, 234-35 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ refd n.r.e.)
(board policy limited to dismissal and not associated with nonrenewal) (pre-TCNA case).
139. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 13.111 (Vernon 1972).
140. See id.
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need not be given. 141
In cases of nonrenewal of a probationary teacher in a continuing
contract district, Texas law requires only that notice of the nonrenewal be made to the teacher no later than the first of April preceding
the natural expiration of the employment term fixed in the contract. 142 Failure to give timely notice shall result in the automatic
reelection of such probationary teacher to continued employment for
the next school year. 143 A probationary contract teacher has the
right, upon notification of the decision not to offer him a contract, to
make a written request for a hearing before the board of trustees.'44
State law does not require the probationary contract teacher to be
informed of the reasons for nonrenewal of his employment until the
hearing before the board.'45 Upon hearing, the board of trustees may
"confirm or revoke" its previous decision.146 The board's decision is
final and nonappealable. 147 Minimum federal constitutional requirements appear to be satisfied because the probationary contract teacher
has no property interest in continued employment upon the natural
148
termination of the contract.
Full constitutional protections come into play should the district
choose to terminate the probationary contract teacher during the
term of the contract. First, the continuing contract district must give
written notice of the "proposed action and of the grounds assigned
therefor." 149 Second, the probationary contract teacher terminated
during the probationary period, upon written request, will be granted
a hearing before the board of trustees to contest his or her termina-

141. See id.§ 13.103.
142. See id. § 13.103.
143. See id. § 13.103; Cummins v. Board of Trustees, 468 S.W.2d 913, 916 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1971, no writ).
144. See TEX. EDUc. CODE ANN. § 13.104 (Vernon 1972).
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See id. The wording "final and nonappealable" has been construed as "prohibiting
only appeals to State administrative authorities and not as denying independent suits such as
.. .breach of contract. . .[or] deprivation of constitutional rights." See Cummins v. Board
of Trustees, 468 S.W.2d 913, 916 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1971, no writ).
148. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 n.6, 578 n.16 (1972); Bowen v.
Calallen Indep. School Dist., 603 S.W.2d 229, 234-35 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
149. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 13.111(a) (Vernon 1972) (emphasis added).
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tion. 5 ° Such written request for a hearing must be made within ten
days after the date the teacher receives official notice of his or her
termination, and the district must fix a hearing date within ten days
after receiving the written request from the teacher. 1 ' The statute
provides that this hearing shall be public unless the teacher makes a
52
written request that the hearing be private. 1
Pursuant to statutory law, the probationary teacher, whom the district proposes to terminate during the course of his probationary period, has the right at a hearing before the board to be represented by
counsel, to hear and reply to the evidence upon which the charges are
based, to cross-examine witnesses, and to present evidence in opposition or mitigation thereof.15 3
The continuing contract teacher is entitled to continue his employment with the district for as long as he desires.' 54 However, the district may terminate his employment contract for statutorily assigned
reasons.155 The teacher terminated from his continuing contract during the year is entitled to written notice from the board of trustees, or
its designate, of the "proposed" action and the grounds assigned
therefor.' 56 A continuing contract teacher dismissed at the end of any
year, or returned to probationary contract status at the end of a
school year, is likewise entitled to written notification of the proposed
action and of the grounds assigned therefor. M The procedural steps
required for terminating a continuing contract teacher, as provided by
chapter 13 of the Education Code, are the same as the steps for terminating a probationary contract teacher.' 5 8 To reiterate, a continuing
contract teacher is entitled to written notification of the proposed ac-

150. See id. § 13.112(a); Heins v. Beaumont Indep. School Dist., 525 F. Supp. 367, 372
(E.D. Tex. 1981), affid, 690 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1982).
151. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 13.112(a) (Vernon 1972).
152. See id. § 13.112(c). Compare Corpus Christi Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. Corpus
Christi Indep. School Dist., 535 S.W.2d 429, 430-31 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, no
writ) (teacher requested public hearing, board went into closed session after close of evidence
but prior to final vote in open session) with Bowen v. Calallen Indep. School Dist., 603 S.W.2d
229, 236 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (teacher failed to object when
board went into executive session).
153. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 13.111, .112(d) (Vernon 1972).
154. See id. § 13.107; Wells v. Hico Indep. School Dist., 736 F.2d 243, 255 (5th Cir.
1984) (continuing contract law method used to establish tenure).
155. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 13.109 (Vernon 1972).
156. Seeid. § 13.111(a).
157. See id.§ 13.111(a).
158. See supra notes 149-53 and accompanying text.
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tion and a hearing before the board of trustees to contest the proposed

action, provided the teacher gives proper and timely notice to the
board indicating his or her desire for same. 59 The district is obligated
to grant the continuing contract teacher a hearing before the board of
trustees." 6 The time and place of such hearing shall be fixed within
6
ten days after receipt of the teacher's written request for same.' '
Similarly, the continuing contract teacher has the right to employ
counsel, to present evidence on his behalf, and to cross-examine the
district's witnesses. 162 The appeal process for a continuing contract
teacher is virtually identical
to the process available to terminated
63
teachers.
term contract
159. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 13.11l(a) (Vernon 1972).

160. See id. § 13.112(a).
161. See id. § 13.112(a).
162. See id. § 13.112(d).
163. See supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text; TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 13.115
(Vernon 1972 & Supp. 1985). If the teacher is terminated or his contract is not renewed, the
teacher may appeal to the commissioner of education. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN.
§ 13.115(a), (b) (Vernon 1972) (notice must be given to board of trustees and commissioner
within 15 days of termination); id. § 11.13(a) (Vernon Supp. 1985) (any dispute with board of
trustees may be appealed to commissioner); Tex. Educ. Agency, 9 Tex. Reg. 4179, 4179 (1984)
(to be codified at 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 157. 1(a)). Section 13.115(a) of the Education Code
also provides a direct appeal to the district court of the county or counties in which the school
district lies if the teacher is terminated during the year. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN.
§ 13.115(a) (Vernon 1972) (appeal must challenge legality of board's action and notice must be
given within 30 days of receipt of notice of termination). The passage of APTRA might block
appeals made directly from the board to the district court, thereby avoiding the commissioner
of education. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a, § 22 (Vernon Supp. 1985) ("all
other laws. . . in conflict with this Act are repealed"). APTRA requires administrative remedies to be exhausted prior to judicial review. See id. § 19(a); see also Butler v. State Bd of
Educ., 581 S.W.2d 751, 755 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See
generally Hill & Kent, Administrative Law, 34 Sw. L.J. 471, 476-78 (1980). Cases have held
that administrative remedies need not be exhausted if the question is solely one of law. See
e.g., Benton v. Wilmer-Hutchins Indep. School Dist., 662 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1983, no writ); Ector County Indep. School Dist. v. Hopkins, 518 S.W.2d 576, 579 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1974, no writ); Garcia v. Pharr, San Juan, Alamo Indep. School Dist., 513
S.W.2d 636, 641 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Administrative remedies must be exhausted prior to instituting suit where factual issues are present. See, e.g.,
Benton v. Wilmer-Hutchins Indep. School Dist., 662 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1983, no writ); Calvin v. Koltermann, Inc., 563 S.W.2d 950, 954-55 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.); De Leon v. Harlingen Consol. Indep. School Dist., 552
S.W.2d 922, 927-28 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, no writ). If either party is dissatisfied after the decision by the commissioner, then the offended party has a right to appeal to the
Travis County district court. See TEX. EDuc. CODE ANN. § 13.115(c) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
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VI.

CONCLUSION

Presently, school officials feel as though they are running a legal
obstacle course upon which the slightest misstep will result in monetary liability for the district, its officials, and administrators. 1 , In addition to the concern of potential liability for a wrongful termination,
districts are concerned that legal, rather than educational, reasons are
causing them to continue the employment of teachers of questionable
merit. At the same time, teachers desire a greater degree of job security and do not want to return to an "at will" employment system.
These conflicting interests have resulted in the passage of two separate
systems of teacher employment which are not always consistent from
either a legal or policy standpoint. Additionally, both systems leave
certain questions of job status or procedure unanswered or, at best,
confused.
Legislative action could eliminate some of the resultant confusion
and uncertainty. For example, there should be statutory guidance for
term contract districts on the decision to terminate a teacher. The
legislature could assign specific reasons for termination (as is done in
continuing contract districts) or it could require term contract districts to adopt policies which set forth the reasons for termination.
Further, the present TCNA provides no procedural rules at all for the
termination of term contract teachers.
Second, the legislature should endeavor to more clearly define the
probationary contract teacher's status in both continuing and term
contract districts. Presently, the continuing contract chapter attempts to place the probationary teachers in a quasi-tenured position
on the question of contract renewal. This forces the district to risk
liability if it attempts to treat the teacher as a non-tenured "at will"
employee. The term contract chapter provides no guidance at all except to say that the "term contract provisions do not apply." Here,
164. This fear of monetary liability is certainly not misplaced. See Jett v. Dallas Indep.

School Dist., No. CA3-83-0824-H (N.D. Tex. Memorandum Opinion and Order, Dec. 10,
1984) ($850,000 damages for wrongful termination); Wells v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., No.
CA3-79-1401-G (N.D. Tex. Judgment, Aug. 22, 1984) ($250,000 damages for wrongful termination); Burnam v. Bay City Indep. School Dist., 445 F. Supp. 927, 935 (S.D. Tex. 1978)

(awarded $17,000 damages for mental anguish, $16,400 for lost wages, and $25,000 in exemplary damages for violation of teacher's first amendment rights and his right to procedurally
correct hearing); Guerra v. Roma Indep. School Dist., 444 F. Supp. 812, 822-23 (S.D. Tex.
1977) (awarded $7500 in back wages and $14,958 in attorney's fees and expenses for nonrenewal of teacher's contract in retaliation for political activities of teacher).
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the substance of new legislation would not be nearly as important as
the fact that the employee's status would be clearly articulated.
Third, the legislature should either eliminate the lengthy and uneconomical appeals process which (pursuant to section 11.13(a)) entitles a terminated teacher to a de novo appeal to the commissioner of
education, or it should provide time lines for speedy resolution of
their administrative appeals. 165 Presently, the district is ofttimes in
the difficult position of having to prove its case one year after the
actual termination, while the teacher is confined in a state of limbo.
The commissioner of education should be instructed to uphold the
decision of the local board for termination if it is supported by substantial evidence in the record, rather than substituting its judgment
for that of the local district. If a terminated teacher complains of a
denial of due process at the hearing before the local board, such point
could be raised in an appeal to the commissioner and be cured by a
remand to the local board, as opposed to the current procedure
whereby the commissioner holds a de novo hearing to cure any such
defect. Similarly, if the terminated teacher complains of any other
error at the local board level, such error could be appealed and resolved by raising those specific points of error to the commissioner, as
in the appeal of a civil case, with no actual evidence taken at the appellate level. Such appellate steps would be beneficial to the districts
by allowing them to retain their discretion in employment matters
while at the same time providing relief for the terminated teacher
should errors be made in the termination/nonrenewal process. Both
parties would benefit by speedy resolution of the matter. While current statutory schemes create challenging legal problems for attorneys, legislative clarification would permit monies currently spent on
resolving legal conflicts to be invested on behalf of the school district's
primary function, the education of its students.

165. See Kirp, Proceduralism and Bureaucracy: Due Process in the School Setting, 28
L. REV. 841, 870-76 (1976) ("Reconsidering the Allure of the Due Process Hearing").
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